To
    Logology and Back–The Late Essays of Kenneth Burke
by Angelo Bonadonna,
    Saint Xavier University
(Delivered at the National
    Communication Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, November 12, 2004)
Nearly thirty years ago,
    in the summer of 1975, Burke confided to Cowley,
The thing is, Malcolm, since Libbie cleared out, I have quit putting
out my books. For two reasons: the second is that she helped
so much by having been a secretary; the first is that she helped so
much by my being so crazy about her, I was driven to prove, prove, prove,
only roundabout to the shitten world, because so directly every day and
night to her I was appealing. (6/9/75)
In this praise of Libbie
    as Muse and secretary, we see Burke’s typical "both-and" dialectic: 
    the consummation of Idea and Matter, or Purpose and Agency, or action and
    motion, transcendence and immanence, Libbie as Soul-mate, Libbie as Body-mate. 
    The decline and death of Libbie roughly coincide with the publication of Burke’s
    last book, Language as Symbolic Action, so one is tempted to take Burke’s
    elegant praise as an accurate statement of his publishing motives.  [1] 
The trouble is Burke did
    continue to publish, and rather voluminously, (however volume-lessly, in terms
    of a single book).  In all, Burke wrote reviews, essays, poems, postscripts,
    replies, and countless letters;  he dabbled in music composition, delivered
    talks, granted interviews–in a word, he verbalized–and with the kind of
    scope and energy typical of any other period in his life.
How might we best characterize
    this last and very productive stage of Burke’s verbalizing?  Limiting
    the task, as I intend, to just one segment of Burke’s public writings, the
    forty-plus critical essays of the post-Libbie, post-LSA era, will probably
    ease the difficulty but slightly.  Regardless of how one chooses to discuss
    or narrow him, Burke defies convenient pigeonholing, and this elusiveness
    of his has gone far towards enhancing his celebrity status among postmodern
    critics.  On the other hand, Burke himself never tired of pointing out
    that the language using animal is a classifying animal, so it seems
    only natural for us to come to terms–to find the right name for this Last
    Phase of Burke’s career.
The earlier periods of his
    life are more or less loosely defined by decade:  the teens present Burke
    the Flaubert, the literary aesthete in New York City; the twenties gave us
    the literary critic, music reviewer, short story writer and novelist; the
    thirties added a literary theorist beneath the critic, and threw in a post-depression,
    quasi-socialist social theorist;  the forties give rise to a language
    philosopher;  the fifties a rhetorician;  the sixties a logologer.
Such a list, while it suggests
    the scope of Burke’s speculations and their development from literature through
    human relations to language theory, presents a rather hollow version of Burke.
    It leaves us with mere titles, which, as Burke himself might remind us, are
    always inadequate when left to stand in their naked, oversimplified generality. 
    Our search here must not merely be for a name for the period, but for
    a suitable strategy for appreciating the full complexity of all that
    is subsumed in that name.  Burke said language not only enables
    but requires us to approach situations strategically.  So as I
    re-read the essays of this period, I kept a running tab of possible strategies
    by which to encompass this most discursive of situations.  What I wish
    to share with you today is a log of those strategies in a presentation that
    is perhaps more pastiche than panorama, but one that is nonetheless offered
    as a heuristic for investigating just what to do with these provocative and
    varied pieces of Burke.
First, I thought I might
    take the lead of other Burkean commentators and identify the distinctive nature
    of the late essays.  James Chesebro, for instance, identifies 1968 as
    the year that Burke finally gave up his "comedic posture" and got
    into the serious business of ontological inquiry (141).  Cary Nelson,
    on the other hand, uses Burke’s late work as the basis for formulating his
    deconstructionist counter-Burke to the humanist Burke of earlier criticism.
Or in a more humanistic
    vein, I could turn to Bill Rueckert who identifies "the Burke who took
    to the road in the late sixties and has stayed on the road ever since, lecturing,
    talking, reading, thinking on his feet–the critic at large in the most literal
    and Emersonian sense of this phrase, which is:  the thinker let loose
    in our midst" ("Rereading" 254).  On the road with Kenneth
    Burke–some very inviting possibilities there–a strategy, might I punningly
    suggest, destined to discover just what was driving Burke those many days
    and words.
Moving along, Strategy 2: 
    Treat the final essays as Burke’s attempt to finalize his system.  On
    July 19, 1972, Burke wrote to Cowley  "Give me but two more years,
    and I’ll prove my point"–though I should point out, as Burke does, that
    he was drunk when he wrote that.
Strategy 3:  List and
    characterize Burke’s co-hagglers of the period, from Wellek, Jameson, and
    Howell to Vitanza, Lentricchia, Booth, and McKeon, and everyone in between.
Strategy 4:  Compare
    the situatedness of these essay with the situatedness of the earlier works. 
    What would Burke the dialectician have been against if he didn’t have technology–the
    perfect scapegoat, since it is so perfectly the caricature, as he says, of
    human rationality?
Strategy 5:  Account
    for the temporal progression among the essays or a sub-group within the essays,
    like, for instance, the Helhaven satires. 
Strategy 6:  Organize
    by genre.
Strategy 7:  Construct
    a concordance of the major recurrent themes, which are as follows:  analogical
    extension;  catharsis and transcendence;  ecology;  the victimization
    of nature;  or, the infanticidal motive of "Ever Onward" ("Creativity"
    74);  or "technologism," the belief that the solution to the
    problems of technology is more technology ("Communication" 148); 
    or, "hypertechnologism";  or, "technological psychosis"; 
    or, the irrationality of the excess of rationality;  or, the "pandemoniac
    multiplicity" of technology ("Towards Looking Back" 189); 
    dramatism as ontology/logology as epistemology;  the trinitarian addition
    of consummation to Burke’s earlier theories of expression and communication; 
    entelechy;  archetype;  consummation as "a kind of creative
    yielding to potentialities which are seen by the given seer to be implicit
    in the given set of terms" ("Poetics" 403);  the autosuggestiveness
    of creativity ("Creativity" 77);  the compulsiveness of creativity; 
    the rounding out of a material operation by a corresponding act of symbolism
    ("Doing and Saying");  substitution and duplication; 
    symbolic duplication as cathartic release or entelechial compulsion ("(Psychological)
    Fable");  the attitude of apprehensiveness;  psychic immobilization
    ("Eye-Poem");  transcendence.
Strategy: 8  How about
    cataloguing new moments in Burke lore, as for instance those rare glimpses
    of Burke responding to much more recent cultural and scenic phenomena than
    those commented on in his more established works?  A favorite of mine
    is his appreciative but cautionary response to J. Hillis Miller in particular
    and postmodern criticism in general.  After discussing Miller’s analysis
    of Hopkins, Burke writes, "This brings out the whole issue in which a
    lot of my colleagues are now interested–that of the marvels of verbal structure. 
    But I have to push back now;  they’ve brought that out too much. 
    People have accused me of just reducing things to words;  the whole system
    is absolutely the opposite of that.  That is, I make a fundamental distinction"
    ("On Literary Form" 85)–and on he goes into his action/motion dualism. 
    Most certainly, Burke does not reduce things to just words.  His environmentalism–or
    anyone’s for that matter–is only logical if we grant that there is indeed
    something outside the text.
Certainly the most songful
    of strategies would be to cull aphorisms from the readings.  Burke credited
    Libbie as the inventor of the Flowerish, and when she passed, so too did the
    art form for Burke.  But, glancing through the readings, one can readily
    spot traces of the erstwhile flourish.  For example:  "no construction
    without destruction" ("Communication" 137);  "the
    driver drives the car, but the traffic drives the driver" ("Why
    Satire 311);  "Organisms live by killing ("Communication"
    136);  "We are happiest when we can plunge on and on" ("Towards
    Helhaven 19);  "Spontaneously, what men hope for is more"
    ("Why Satire" 320);  "Congregation by segregation"
    ("Rhetorical Situation" 268);  "Life is a Pilgrimage. 
    Life is a first draft, with constant revisions that are themselves first drafts. 
    . . .   Life is a series of prerequisite courses, in which we are
    all drop-outs" ("Rhetoric" 33);  ... [I]n a
    cult of tragedy, one is asking for it" ("Dancing" 27); 
    "Language is one vast menagerie of implications" ("Theology"
    153);  Logology’s wan analogue of hope is "the futuristically slanted
    and methodological engrossment in the tracking down of implications, which
    may amount to translating the grand oracular utterance, "Know thyself"
    into "Spy on thyself" ("Variations" 165);  and finally,
    my favorite:  "Though language does talk a lot, the very essence
    of its genius is in its nature as abbreviation" ("(Nonsymbolic)
    Motion" 823).
A few strategies are implied
    in my title, "To Logology and Back."  For instance, we might
    ask just where is Burke going in his development of logology?  Accordingly,
    I could clarify "logology," or words about words, by listing several
    of its key components, many of which are "borrowed back" from theology. 
    From St. Thomas we get the principle of individuation, which for Burke is
    the body; from God we get godterms;  from the Scholastics we get the
    slogan, "Crede ut intellegas":  Believe that you may
    understand;  from St. Paul we get the principle that faith comes from
    hearing–i.e., from doctrine;  from the Trinity we get the formal pattern
    of naming. "Logology is vigilant with admonitions" ("Variations"
    171). all of which circulate about its central question, "What is it
    to be the typically symbol-using animal?" ("Variations" 169).
By my title I would also
    suggest, though very indirectly, the possibility that Burke’s development
    of logology is merely one of his last and most thorough defenses against his
    lifelong fear of death.  In the interview by Harry Chapin in the early
    seventies Burke mentions his profound fear of death (much stronger when he
    was younger than at that time when he was in his mid-seventies).  In
    his essay "The Party Line" he announces an addendum to his "Definition
    of Man," "acquiring foreknowledge of death" (65).  But
    it was a letter to Cowley, not the essays or the Chapin film, that first gave
    me this notion of logology as a psychic cure for the fear of death. 
    
From early on Cowley and
    Burke defined how each one’s project was motivated.  On November 26,
    1974, Burke distinguishes his project from Cowley’s thus:  "Basically,
    I think it would all berl [sic, of course] down to a distinction between
    what you mean by ‘literary situation’ as background, and what I would sloganize
    as ‘logological’ context of our poetizings."  While Cowley undertook
    the portraiture of a particular generation, Burke would but dabble with the
    particular–a dazzling few pages, for instance, on the formal qualities of
    the ghost’s entrance in Hamlet–as a way to get to general formal principles. 
    Cowley’s work would be needed for an informed view of, say, Ernest Hemingway
    or William Faulkner, but Burke’s is required for a fuller understanding of
    any symbolic action, from the most mindless yeasaying a demagogue to
    the full reflexive action of a Shakespearean drama. 
Burke would often sloganize
    his project as "Literature in particular, language in general,"
    but–especially in the later years–the proportion shifts decidedly to language
    in general.  "Language in general," or the "‘logological’
    context of our poetizings"–what are these but the deathless realm of
    timeless logic, knowledge, and principles?  To the extent that Burke
    has formulated a "logology," an epistemology, a "science,"
    or philosophy rather of the general functions of language that apply to any
    particular idiom, has he not indeed transcended death?  Burke’s imperviousness
    to critical fads is a sign of partial success on this score.  Is the
    study of logology,motivated by an attempt to rise above the deathy realm of
    particulars into a veritable eternity of logical order?  Can Burke’s
    ascent to logology be Burke’s way to heaven, without the baggage of religion?
Getting back to my title,
    what about the "and back" part of it? By this I want to suggest
    the age-old critical question of whether Burke develops at all in his adoption
    of different terminologies or whether he is engaged in writing the same book
    over and over again.
Many of my strategies come
    to a head in Burke’s statement:  "No one could go on making his
    words mean the same, even if he expended his best efforts to make them stay
    put" ("Theology" 185).  Does one detect, lurking in this
    statement, a nostalgic desire to keep meaning settled once and for all? 
    Perhaps, but it is instructive to juxtapose another provocative comment in
    which he defines the "minimum condition" for symbolic action as
    "the inability of words to ‘stay put,’ as when even a proper name like
    ‘Caesar,’ referring to one particular person in history, gives birth to
    such words as ‘Kaiser’ and ‘Czar’" ("(Nonsymbolic) Motion"
    813).
This matter of "staying
    put" addresses a host of issues, foremost among them being the question
    of whether Burke is a system-builder, and whether or not he viewed the eternal
    flux of language as a benefit or liability.  The ambiguities of Burke’s
    attitude are most suggestively intermingled in his "Theory of Terminology,"
    an essay which outlines five categories of meaning, Burke’s famous five dogs. 
    The dogs cover the important Burkean principles of verbal entelechy, tautological
    cycles of terms, the synecdochic, Freudian, metaphoric, and musical qualities
    of words–in a word all types of verbal transformations that will infuse a
    term with new, opposite, and apposite meanings.  At first, Burke’s attitude
    toward the sophistic realities of language seem quite clear:
I should feel uneasy if I had to keep these various kinds of terministic
    cycles trimly related to one another, so that I might make a composite photograph
    of the lot.  Rather, I would turn that whole subject around, and call
    attention to the fact that much of the freedom in man’s capacity for symbolic
    action resides precisely in the range of improvising here open to him, collectively
    shared by all the members of his tribe.  (90)
But then to illustrate this freedom, Burke offers
    a curious figure:
A
    cycle of terms is like a cluster of stars.  The sky, as viewed from any
    one of such positions, will show a corresponding difference in the distribution
    of the other positions, though they all ultimately form but one single set
    of interrelationships.  And it is in this way that a man defies total
    prediction until he is finished.  Indeed, prediction is in effect the
    application to living man of parameters derived from the realm of death; 
    that is, the possibilities of the future reduced to terms derived from the
    past.  (90)
Typically here, Burke confounds his fluidities with
    some fixities, his freedoms with some parameters, his positionality with an
    Ultimate Position, a single, all-encompassing set of interrelationships. 
    
Aswirl in strategies, I
    began to feel the onset of the old logologer’s ailment, counter-gridlock,
    just as I was to begin wrapping up.  As matters stand, the only way to
    conclude a paper like this is with yet another question, or, taking another
    route, with a simplifying anecdote to answer all questions.  Burke supplies
    an irresistible anecdote in his "Creativity" essay.  He writes: 
    
I
    have asked students to write me three pieces, one praising something, one
    inveighing against something, and one lamenting.  The students were to
    choose whatever subjects they preferred, for each such exercise.  One
    student, choosing but one subject, praised, inveighed, and lamented within
    the range of that one theme alone.  ...  [W]hat of that
    student who subjected the same topic to three totally different attitudes?
    (78).
So, Burke gives me a concluding
    anecdote that ends in a question.  But:  Did not that student pay
    Burke the most reverent homage imaginable by enacting the very attitude towards
    language implicit in and unifying, though discursively, all of Burke’s writings? 
    Has not the mischievous student of a more mischievous teacher come to see,
    if only inchoately, that language requires such liquidity if one would strive
    for "maximum consciousness" (ATH 171)?  Is not such
    a student on his way to seeing, as Burke clearly did, that language is forever
    doubling reality, forever entitling it;  forever changing, forever remaining
    just as it is, forever defining, forever substituting its definitions? 
    And finally, is not the good student learning that if language it has the
    power to transport us into the "heaven" of the subtlest theology,
    and uplift us with the pious and beautiful songs of thanksgiving that theology
    inspires, it also has equal power to transcend downwards, as it gives "rise"
    to pollution, bombs, and demagoguery?
Might I then conclude, tentatively, or with some measure
    of intelligent inconclusiveness as homage to Burke’s attitude, that the same
    liquidity Burke asks for in our attitudes toward life characterize our attitude
    towards Burke himself?  Burke now is finished.  His works just are,
    and, as he might say, if all his words were obliterated tomorrow, they will
    go on forever having been uttered.  They have formed a completed total
    set of relationships, like the stars in the universe.  Even if we could
    encompass the totality rather than take partial perspectives on it, the fact
    remains that for us, still in time, his meanings will not stay put. 
    That’s the only fitting last word on Burke–a roundabout invitation to more
    words.
  
Works Cited
Burke, Kenneth.  Attitudes Toward History.  Berkeley:
    U of California P, 1984.
—.  "Communication and the Human Condition."  Communication 
    1  (1974):  135-52.
—.  "On ‘Creativity’–A Partial Retraction." 
    Introspection:  The Artist Looks at Himself.  Ed.  Donald
    E. Hayden.  U of Tulsa Monography Series 12, 1971.
—.  "Doing and Saying:  Thoughts on Myth, Cult, and
    Archetypes."  Salmagundi  7  (1971):  100-19.
—.  Dramatism and Development.  Worcester, Mass.: 
    Clark UP, 1972.
—.  "An Eye-Poem for the Ear (with Prose Introduction, Glosses,
    and After-Words)."  Directions in Literary Criticism. 
    Ed. Stanley Weintraub and Phillip Young.  University Park:  Pennsylvania
    State UP, 1973:  228-51.
—.  Language as Symbolic Action:  Essays on Life, Literature,
    and Method.  Berkeley: U of California P, 1966.
—.  "On Literary Form."  The New Criticism and
    After.  Ed. Thomas Daniel Young.  Charlottesville:  UP
    of Virginia, 1976:  80-90.
—.  "(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action." 
    Critical Inquiry  4  (1978):  809-38.
—.  "The Party Line."  Quarterly Journal of
    Speech  62  (1976):  62-68.
—.  "Poetics and Communication."  Contemporary
    Philosophical Thought.  Vol. 3:  Perspectives in Education,
    Religion, and the Arts.  Ed. Howard Evans Kiefer and Milton Karl
    Munitz.  Albany:  State U of New York P, 1970:  401-18.
—.  "In Response to Booth:  Dancing with Tears in My
    Eyes."  Critical Inquiry  1  (1974):  32-31.
—.  "Rhetoric, Poetics, and Philosophy."  Rhetoric,
    Philosophy and Literature:  An Exploration.  Ed. Don M. Burks. 
    West Lafayette:  Purdue UP, 1978:  15-33.
—.  "A (Psychological) Fable, with a (Logological) Moral." 
    American Imago  35  (1978):  203-7.
—.  "The Rhetorical Situation."  Communication
    Ethical and Moral Issues.  Ed. Lee Thayer.  New York: 
    Gordon and Breach Science, 1973:  263-75.
—.  "Theology and Logology."  Kenyon Review,
    n.s., (1979):  151-85.
—.  "A Theory of Terminology."  Interpretation: 
    The Poetry of Meaning.  Ed. Stanley Romain Hopper and David L. Miller. 
    New York:  Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967:  83-102.
—.  "Towards Helhaven:  Three Stages of a Vision." 
    Sewanee Review  79  (1971):  11-25.
—.  "Towards Looking Back."  Journal of General
    Education  28  (1976):  167-89.
—.  "Variation on ‘Providence.’"  Notre Dame
    English Journal  13  (1981):  155-83.
—.  "Why Satire, with a Plan for Writing One." 
    Michigan Quarterly Review  13  (1974):  307-37.
Chesebro, James W.  "Epistemology and Ontology as Dialectical
    Modes in the Writings of Kenneth Burke."  Landmark Essays on
    Kenneth Burke.  Ed. Barry Brummett.  Davis, CA:  Hermagoras
    P, 1993.
Jay, Paul, ed.  The Selected Correspondence of Kenneth Burke
    and Malcolm Cowley, 1915-1981.  New York:  Viking, 1988.
Nelson, Cary.  "Writing as the Accomplice of Language." 
    Simons and Melia 156-173.
Rueckert, William H.  "Rereading Kenneth Burke." 
    Simons and Melia 239-261.
Simons, Herbert W., and Trevor Melia, eds.  The Legacy of Kenneth
    Burke.  Madison:  U of Wisconsin P, 1989.
 [1]        
    Dramatism and Development,
    published in 1972, is more a pamphlet or a pair of essays (two Clark University
    lectures), than a book by the standard of Burke’s other books.